The Varieties of Consciousness. BY URIAH KRIEGEL. (Oxford UP, 2015, Pp. viii + 285. Price £44.49.)

Uriah Kriegel's third book confirms his reputation as a leading figure in the philosophy of consciousness. His ambitious project is to answer the question '...how many types of sui generis, irreducible, basic, primitive phenomenology do we need to posit to just be able to *describe* the stream of consciousness?' (p. 1). Kriegel's timely book offers a systematic overview of the issue's logical geography and makes a number of important new contributions to the debate. In particular, he adds weight to the growing literature challenging the orthodox view that our phenomenal life is exhausted by perceptual and algedonic (pain/pleasure) experiences – a view Kriegel labels 'mainstream stingy-ism' (p. 6).

Kriegel's extensive introduction clarifies the book's target question and lays out his strategy. He explains that the question does not concern specific phenomenal properties, but rather the broad phenomenal determinables of which all specific phenomenal properties are determinates (p. 9). He introduces a clear and practicable strategy for identifying what these phenomenal types are, explaining that for any putative phenomenal type we must decide between: a) the *eliminativist* view that this type of experience does not exist; b) the *reductionist* view that experiences of this type do exist but are reducible to experiences of some other type; c) the *primitivist* view that this type is a sui generis irreducible phenomenal type. This procedure will ultimately provide us with a set of primitive types that constitute all experience.

The book's tentative conclusion is that there are six types of phenomenology: three sensory kinds (perceptual, algedonic and imaginative) and three nonsensory kinds (cognitive, conative and the phenomenology of entertaining a proposition) (p. 196). All other kinds of experience – including emotional phenomenology and moral phenomenology – are suggested to be reducible to some combination of experiences of these types. Kriegel notes that this *phenomenal* reduction should not be confused with *physical* reduction (p. 5). Indeed, one of the virtues of the book is that it shows how deeply consciousness can be explored whilst bracketing the all-too-familiar issue of physicalism. Kriegel is refreshingly realistic about the difficulties entailed by phenomenological debate, and does a good job of laying out credible dialectical strategies and finding an appropriate role for introspection in his investigation.

Chapter 1 considers cognitive phenomenology. Kriegel argues that cognitive states are all and only those mental states that: i) have the attitudinal property of presenting-as-true their content and; ii) are nonsensory (p. 46). These conditions differentiate the cognitive from the conative and the perceptual respectively. To motivate the conclusion that there is a primitive phenomenology of cognition, Kriegel offers a vivid and detailed thought experiment. In brief, Zoe is a partial zombie who lacks all perceptual and algedonic experiences but who nevertheless enjoys a phenomenology – specifically, the rich intellectual experience of solving mathematical problems (pp. 53-65). Having argued for the *existence* of cognitive phenomenology, Kriegel then offers a preliminary sketch of its *character* by building a complex Ramsey sentence composed of '…phenomenological platitudes about making a judgement' (p. 65).

Chapter 2 considers conative phenomenology and argues that conative states are those states that: i) have the attitudinal property of representing-as-good their content (on a 'maximally neutral'

understanding of goodness) and; ii) are nonsensory (p. 74). In characteristing conative experience Kriegel suggests that '…the most fundamental experience of exercising the will is that of deciding-and-then-trying to ϕ' (p. 83). This interesting take on conative experience draws heavily on Ricœur, and is one of several points in the book where Kriegel draws knowledgeably on the insights of the phenomenologists, using them as a springboard for his own distinctive conclusions.

Chapter 3 concerns the phenomenology of entertaining a proposition. This topic rarely crops up in the contemporary literature, and it is interesting to see Kriegel's case for regarding it as a phenomenological primitive. Where cognitive states present their content as true, and conative states present their content as good, entertaining a proposition presents content *neutrally* (p. 98). Kriegel's characterisation of this type of phenomenology moves very quickly from claims about the nature of episodes of entertaining to claims about our *experience* of such episodes – a move that many would query. Inferences of this kind occur often in the book and perhaps reflect Kriegel's background conviction (developed in his previous book) that all mental representation is ultimately grounded in the phenomenal. I suspect that those who don't share that assumption will find some of his inferences unconvincing, or at least in need of further support.

Chapters 4 and 5 consider emotional phenomenology and moral phenomenology respectively. In both cases, Kriegel argues convincingly that such experiences are reducible to some combination of the phenomenal types already countenanced. Each chapter unpacks the potential implications of his phenomenological conclusions for long-standing philosophical debates, offering an original theory of emotion and a distinctive solution to a fundamental problem in meta-ethics. Both theoretical proposals are intriguing contributions to the literature, though in each case there remain challenges to be confronted. For instance, Kriegel attempts to revive the view that emotions are essentially felt episodes by eschewing proprioceptive feelings in favour of *cognitive* feelings that can have the kind of content that emotions are now generally thought to possess. Unconscious emotions present a difficulty for this view, and Kriegel suggests that unconscious states qualify as emotions only insofar as they resemble prototypical felt emotions. However, it is not clear: i) whether this really respects the spirit of a feeling theory of emotion; ii) whether any relation to the phenomenal can be specified that does the job Kriegel needs, or; iii) whether unconscious emotion can be efficacious if its nature is bestowed relationally (thanks to Sam Coleman for this last point).

In his concluding section Kriegel argues for a primitive phenomenology of imagination, which he characterises as the sensory analogue of neutrally entertaining a proposition. He reflects on his six phenomenal types and makes a tentative case against the existence of any further primitives. Although I do not see any obvious candidates for a seventh phenomenal type, I do think Kriegel overlooks high-level perceptual experience. As well as perceiving low-level properties such as shapes and colours, it is sometimes claimed that we perceive high-level properties such as being a pine tree or being good. Other than a brief mention in the Appendix (p. 209), this kind of phenomenal property does not figure in Kriegel's investigation. Of course, if such phenomenal properties exist they would fall under the perceptual phenomenal type rather than constituting a distinct kind of experience. Nevertheless, they are relevant to Kriegel's project for several reasons: i) Kriegel's methodology, including his triad of options, is clearly applicable to high-level perceptual phenomenology; ii) such phenomenal properties are important potential counter-examples to the 'stingy' view against which Kriegel is fighting; iii) most importantly, if these properties are included in

the potential reduction base of the experiences investigated, promising hypotheses emerge that diverge from Kriegel's own. For instance, Kriegel regards the experience of understanding spoken words (p. 40), and the feeling of frustration at failure (p.135), as *cognitive* experiences, and does not confront the possibility that such cases could credibly be regarded as high-level perceptual experiences.

The book also includes a captivating extended Appendix in which Kriegel considers the phenomenology of freedom. He notes that although it is not plausibly a primitive phenomenal type, it is an underexplored feature of experience of great importance to various theoretical issues. Through a vivid description of his own experience of freedom after a two month stint in prison, and careful reflection on a range of case studies, Kriegel highlights a number of aspects of the experience of freedom. His key conclusion is that '…there exists a *distinctive* phenomenology as of negative, compatibilist, and basically-intransitive freedom.' (p. 241) He boldly suggests that this phenomenal property evident in his case studies is also a pervasive feature of the experiences of all free subjects, albeit one that generally goes unnoticed. To my mind, Kriegel does too little to rule out the alternative possibility that this feature is simply *absent* in ordinary experiences. That said, his suggestion that the phenomenology of freedom deserves serious attention is surely correct.

Many of us will have had the experience of trying to achieve the right level of zoom on Google Maps: too close and you lose sight of your overall journey, too distant and you lose sight of the details you need for navigation. Philosophical monographs present an analogous challenge, and in many ways this is a 'zoomed out' book. The descriptions of our phenomenology often avoid some of the fine-grained questions considered crucial in the wider literature, and the arguments put forward are often sketches that skim over potentially critical details. By Kriegel's own admission, the results of his investigation are generally preliminary rather than fully worked through (e.g. p. 113; p. 116; p. 143; p. 201; p. 230). However, this should by no means be regarded as a failing of the book. The literature is calling out for a 'big picture' book that imposes order on the debate, identifies promising lines of inquiry and offers provocative new proposals. This is precisely what Kriegel has achieved.

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